

10-1-1984

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Recommended Citation

Lowry, Sharon K.. "Mirrors and Blue Smoke: Stephen Dorsey and the Santa Fe Ring in the 1880s." *New Mexico Historical Review* 59, 4 (1984). <https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nmhr/vol59/iss4/4>

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*MIRRORS AND BLUE SMOKE:
STEPHEN DORSEY AND THE SANTA FE RING
IN THE 1880s*

SHARON K. LOWRY

NEW MEXICO IN THE EARLY 1880s provided a haven and a breeding ground for a host of politically able and ambitious men. Although all enjoyed varying degrees of local fame or notoriety, perhaps the most notorious of these men nationally was Stephen W. Dorsey. A one-term United States senator for Arkansas, the Ohio native had served most recently as secretary of the Republican National Committee, from which position he had engineered James A. Garfield's successful bid for the presidency. With Garfield's death, however, Dorsey's enemies had gathered like vultures, and he became the chief defendant in the infamous star route postal fraud investigations. Although two successive juries acquitted Dorsey of conspiracy in the star route frauds, almost no one took these verdicts seriously, and most believed that Dorsey had been the mastermind behind a system of frauds that had robbed the Post Office Department of approximately four million dollars.

Dorsey was at the height of his political power in March 1881, but by the end of the second star route trial in 1883 he had resigned his position on the Republican National Committee and was in disgrace. After the second trial, Dorsey pronounced himself "disgusted" with politics and spoke of abandoning that occupation; however, he soon became obsessed with the idea of returning to power to vindicate himself and punish those who had persecuted him.¹ To revive his political fortunes, Dorsey looked to New Mexico, where he hoped to turn local popularity and large landholdings into renewed political strength:



Stephen W Dorsey

Senator Stephen Dorsey in the early 1870s. Courtesy of the Library of Congress.

New Mexico will soon become one among the sisterhood of states. I will stand for the United States Senate, and when I rise in my place to denounce the cowardly, scheming crew who have almost dogged me to my grave and almost driven my dear wife into a madhouse, the record I will give of them will sink them so far beneath the waves of popular indignation that the resurrection horn will never reach them.²

The story of Dorsey's attempt to rebuild his political fortunes is an object lesson in the truth of Thomas Hobbes's dictum in *Leviathan*: "The reputation of power is power." In the world of politics, one has power if people think one does. A more recent writer described political power as an illusion composed of clouds of blue smoke manipulated with mirrors.³ By tilting the mirrors just right, a politician can create the illusion of thick, billowing clouds of powerful smoke. But if the mirror breaks, the smoke disappears, and the politician once described as powerful is exposed as only a not very skilled magician. This change is what eventually happened to Stephen Dorsey in New Mexico, and although one hesitates to stretch the analogy, the ultimate power of the Santa Fe Ring may have lain in Thomas B. Catron's ability with mirrors.

Dorsey hoped to revitalize his political career in a territory whose political structure was hopelessly chaotic. Because New Mexico was a territory, most of its officials were appointed in Washington, and many of these appointments were made to satisfy patronage obligations, with little concern given to the welfare of New Mexico.⁴ Washington appointees controlled the high administrative and judicial positions in the territory, while the people elected members of the legislature, the delegate to Congress, and lower county officials. The delegate could not vote in Congress, however, and territorial legislation was subject to review in Washington. New Mexico's territorial status thus created a vacuum in the place of real political authority: elected officials had no real power, and appointed officials were usually not in office long enough to develop any sympathy for New Mexico or any strong political following.

Into this vacuum crowded the bewildering array of factions that characterized New Mexico politics in the Gilded Age, factions existing not out of loyalty to a political party or identification with

the territory of New Mexico, but out of devotion to an individual or dedication to a cause. The major factions were the nebulous Santa Fe Ring and its opponents, claimants of large Spanish and Mexican land grants and those who opposed the grants, and supporters and opponents of statehood for the territory. New Mexican politics also broke along geographical lines, with the Rio Abajo region to the south of Santa Fe envious of the power wielded by Santa Fe and the Rio Arriba region to the north. These groups, always amorphous at best, often overlapped, with people crossing party and factional lines at will. Thus, for example, supporters of the Maxwell land grant in Colfax County split into pro- and anti-Santa Fe Ring adherents, and the ring itself split in 1884 along Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo lines.⁵ All groups contained Democrats, Republicans, and a variety of third-party advocates.

The most notorious of these factions was the Santa Fe Ring, under the reputed leadership of Thomas B. Catron. Catron, the ablest lawyer in a territory noted for its attorneys, had built his reputation and his fortune out of a practice dealing almost exclusively with titles to Spanish and Mexican land grants. Accepting land as payment for his efforts in having the grants confirmed, Catron became the largest landholder in an area where land represented power as well as wealth. Catron began wielding political power in New Mexico as United States attorney for the territory and law partner of Territorial Delegate Stephen B. Elkins. By 1880, Catron was the most powerful man in New Mexico and was credited with manipulating the politics and the economy of the territory through the mechanism of the Santa Fe Ring.⁶

The Santa Fe Ring, as one historian has noted, was an amorphous coalition of "aggressive, influential men, . . . who took advantage of their intelligence, wealth, and personal drive, to dominate and maneuver political and economic affairs in the territory for their personal financial benefit."⁷ In his annual report to the Department of the Interior in 1887, New Mexico Surveyor General George W. Julian charged that Dorsey and the other members of the Santa Fe Ring had "brooded over [New Mexico] like a pestilence for a quarter of a century. . . . They have confounded political distinctions and subordinated everything to their impelling greed for land."⁸

The Santa Fe Ring probably enjoyed its most tangible existence in the minds of its opponents, who were quick to confer ring membership on anyone who was involved in land speculation or whose political ambition collided with theirs. According to Governor Edmund Ross, who spent most of his time in office trying to rid the territory of rings, the Santa Fe Ring stood at the center of the web of territorial rings it controlled, of which "Cattle Rings, Public Land Stealing Rings, Mining Rings, [and] Treasury Rings" were only the most visible.⁹ Ross charged that the Santa Fe Ring operated by absorbing every important territorial official, so that the ring could count among its members an endless succession of territorial governors, attorneys general, surveyors general, United States attorneys, district judges, county probate judges, and the chairmen of the Republican and Democratic territorial executive committees.¹⁰

While a group such as the Santa Fe Ring might have come together occasionally for their own mutual benefit, the ring was never as unified as Ross suggested. The group that came together on one issue might dissolve into warring factions over another. Indeed, during the 1880s bitter political campaigns pitted reputed Santa Fe Ring candidates against each other for the same office. Of the individuals said to compose the ring, Catron and Dorsey were seldom in harmony, Catron and L. Bradford Prince were rarely in harmony, and Dorsey and Prince were never in harmony. The list could go on. Also, one would commit a grave error in assuming, for example, that because Catron and Dorsey were both interested in the Maxwell grant, they were interested in the grant together.

Dorsey earned his "membership" in the Santa Fe Ring through his association with Catron and Elkins, and his baptism into New Mexico politics was bloody. Catron and Elkins had brought him into the fraternity of New Mexico land speculators in 1877 by inducing him to purchase the Uña de Gato private land grant in Colfax County, a grant that today enjoys distinction as the only private land claim that no New Mexico historian will attempt to defend as genuine. When the grant came under government attack as a fraud in 1877, Catron and Elkins abandoned Dorsey to the clutches of the federal investigators, leaving him as the sole defender of this malodorous claim. To the enemies of the Santa Fe

Ring, Catron and Elkins were obviously using Dorsey for the influence he commanded as a United States senator. Dorsey thus became a fully incorporated member of the ring; the only debate was over whether Dorsey's involvement in this conspiracy was willing or innocent.¹¹

Out of the "exhausting factionalism" of New Mexico politics Dorsey sought to fashion a renewed political career.¹² Returning to New Mexico after the star route trials, he tried to make a place for himself in the territory's Republican organization, and he expressed his interest in returning to the United States Senate.¹³ Politically, however, Dorsey labored in New Mexico under a series of crippling disadvantages. First, he was a relative newcomer to a territory that harbored a surfeit of politically able and ambitious men. Unlike Arkansas, where the local Republicans' hold on power had been so tenuous that Dorsey could easily shunt them aside, he found in New Mexico a host of immovable competitors for office, like Catron, who had worked for a seat in the United States Senate for years and who would not be impressed by Dorsey's experience, talent, or ambition.

Equally crippling to one who sought to build his political fortunes from a base in Colfax County, Dorsey's ownership of the Uña de Gato land grant and his interest in the Maxwell grant placed him squarely on the side of the large landowners in a county whose population was overwhelmingly antigrant. The Maxwell grant covered all of western Colfax County, and many Colfax County voters were homesteaders whom the grant's owners were trying to evict. The battle between the Maxwell claimants and homesteaders had erupted in the Colfax County War in the 1870s, the lines of which were complicated by a rift between Colfax County supporters of the grant and members of the Santa Fe Ring who were interested in controlling it.¹⁴ While the Colfax County War was over by the time Dorsey sought to build a New Mexico political career, animosities remained, lines had not softened, and a Santa Fe Ring supporter of the Maxwell grant would find himself on the wrong side of every political alignment in Colfax County.

Dorsey sought to overcome these handicaps through liberal applications of the fabled Dorsey hospitality and charm. He entertained lavishly at his Mountain Spring ranch in Colfax County,

ingratiating himself not only with the people of his region, but with important territorial officials as well. He was elected commander of the Raton post of the Grand Army of the Republic, and he contributed the design and the materials for construction of the monument to Kit Carson that now stands in Santa Fe.¹⁵ Because of his large land-holdings and his apparent wealth, Dorsey enjoyed considerable influence in Colfax County, an influence he sought to solidify and expand through the purchase of two county newspapers, the *Colfax County Stockman* and the *Raton Range*.¹⁶ Although many people in New Mexico remained skeptical regarding Dorsey's involvement in the star route frauds—one newspaper played on Dorsey's initials to tag him with the epithet "Stolen Wealth Dorsey"¹⁷—several endorsements by the legendary atheist Robert G. Ingersoll, and Ingersoll's presence in Colfax County as Dorsey's guest, at least partially refurbished Dorsey's sagging reputation. Dorsey could still command the attention and friendship of at least one prominent national political figure.¹⁸ But by 1884 the political divisions in Colfax County were complicated by a split in the territorial Republican party, and Dorsey would soon find himself in a political situation impossible for him to control.

Rivalry between the Rio Arriba and Rio Abajo elements of New Mexico's Republican party, born of economic rivalry between the sections, was a familiar feature of New Mexico's political landscape. As the western terminus of the Santa Fe Trail, Santa Fe had long been the logical center of New Mexico's economic and political activity. In 1880, however, the main line of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad bypassed Santa Fe in favor of Albuquerque, and that city quickly surpassed Santa Fe in economic growth. By 1884, Rio Abajo politicians who had chafed under what they perceived as rule by a Santa Fe monopoly were impatient to secure the political power to which they believed their economic strength entitled them.

The most obvious symbol of political power was the territorial capital itself, and its removal from Santa Fe to Albuquerque became the central issue of the legislative session of 1884. But the Rio Abajo did not yet have the power to dislodge Santa Fe from its preeminent position in New Mexico politics. In an atmosphere charged with accusations of ballot box stuffing and ballot stealing, and in the

absence of many Rio Abajo members, Catron and other Rio Arriba members passed a bill authorizing the erection of a permanent capitol building in Santa Fe.¹⁹

The bitterness of this battle lingered on after the session, and as the territorial Republican convention approached, Las Cruces attorney William L. Rynerson and former territorial Chief Justice L. Bradford Prince competed for the Republican nomination for territorial delegate to Congress. Although Rynerson had long been a reputed member of the Santa Fe Ring, he campaigned in the Rio Abajo on an antiring platform, claiming that the Santa Feans held too much power.²⁰ Prince, also reputed to be a ring member, saw himself as a reformer.²¹ At the convention, Rynerson and his followers bolted in the face of a hostile chairman and held their own convention, nominating Rynerson, while those who remained behind nominated Prince.²² Thus, Prince and Rynerson entered the fall campaign claiming to be the Republican nominee for delegate. The Democrats, meanwhile, nominated former Taos County Probate Judge Antonio Joseph and waited gleefully for the inevitable Republican collapse.

This three-cornered campaign took on many curious aspects when it reached Colfax County. All three candidates were reportedly members of the Santa Fe Ring, but Rynerson and Joseph managed to escape the association by running effective antiring campaigns.²³ In addition, the Democratic party in Colfax County had long been identified as the antigrant party, and Joseph became a willing antigrant candidate, carefully hiding his questionable dealings with several land grants.²⁴ Antiring Republicans who opposed the power of the large landholders in Colfax County supported Rynerson.²⁵

Dorsey might have been expected to support Prince in this campaign, if only because the other candidates held unacceptable positions on the land grant issue central to Dorsey's livelihood. But Dorsey and Prince were implacable enemies, dating from Prince's defection from Roscoe Conkling's New York machine in 1876. Dorsey had assisted Conkling in blocking Prince's confirmation for a New York Customs House position in 1877.²⁶ As a favor to Conkling after Garfield's election, Dorsey had tried to have Prince removed from the patronage position he enjoyed as chief justice of New

Mexico, and Prince had retaliated by accusing Dorsey of land and mail fraud.²⁷ Dorsey and Prince could never be political allies.

Dorsey's failure to support Prince, and perhaps his failure to support Blaine nationally, has led at least one historian of the 1884 campaign to infer that Dorsey supported Joseph.²⁸ This is not the case. Even if Dorsey could have considered campaigning for a Democrat, it would not have been Antonio Joseph. Joseph had worked for Dorsey as a subcontractor on one of Dorsey's mail routes and had testified for the prosecution in the star route trials, and even though Joseph's testimony was not particularly damaging to Dorsey, neither did it earn for Joseph a place among Dorsey's friends.²⁹

Dorsey thus supported Rynerson in the campaign of 1884, but only because he had no alternative, and he was not comfortable in this alliance. He sympathized with the regular Republican machinery in New Mexico, but he could not tolerate Prince.³⁰ In September, Dorsey attempted to heal the rift in the Republican ranks and to obtain a more suitable candidate for territorial delegate by suggesting to Prince's and Rynerson's managers that their candidates withdraw from the race in favor of a compromise nominee.³¹ A meeting was held in Las Vegas, New Mexico, for the purpose of effecting this compromise, but Prince, who had coveted the delegateship since 1882, refused to withdraw, and Rynerson would not surrender the field to Prince.³² Dorsey thereupon wrote to Prince, repeating his conviction that the failure of the compromise amounted to a surrender of the territory to the Democrats "for many years to come," and he continued to support Rynerson, who he predicted would poll "much the largest part of the American vote of this territory."³³

The Republican candidates combined for a majority of the votes cast in the delegate contest of 1884, but Joseph won the election, generating much bitterness among New Mexico's disgruntled Republicans. Prince held the Santa Fe Ring responsible for the Republican party split, blaming Catron and Dorsey for his defeat.³⁴ Governor Ross, who worked vigorously for Joseph during the campaign, later became disillusioned with his candidate and saw him as a tool of the Santa Fe Ring; Ross charged that the ring had

engineered the Republican split for the purpose of electing Joseph.³⁵ In Colfax County, Joseph's victory was hailed as a defeat for the holders of large land grants.³⁶

For the next several months, Dorsey concentrated on his personal finances, leaving a badly scarred Republican party licking its wounds. But when the campaign season of 1886 arrived, Dorsey was once again ready to do battle in New Mexico's political arena.³⁷ The *Colfax County Stockman* declared that "there are several plums now ripening for those who would have the nerve and ability to pluck them," and the paper credited Dorsey with both.³⁸ The plum to be plucked in this case was the office of territorial delegate to Congress, which Dorsey wanted for his friend, Joseph Dwyer, another Colfax County rancher and president of the Territorial Cattle Growers' Association. Dwyer was also, in 1886, chairman of the territorial Republican party.³⁹

Dwyer had come to New Mexico from Washington late in the 1870s, and Dorsey likely knew him when they were in Washington.⁴⁰ By the time of the territorial Republican convention in September 1886, Dwyer was clearly the leading candidate for the nomination for territorial delegate, and he received the nomination without opposition.⁴¹ The convention also established a territorial executive committee to conduct the Republican campaign, and Dorsey was elected chairman of this committee.⁴²

The Democrats nominated Antonio Joseph to succeed himself as delegate, and the Democratic campaign was orchestrated by party chairman Charles Gildersleeve. A former law partner of Catron, Gildersleeve was the leading Democratic figure in the Santa Fe Ring, and he and fellow ring member Joseph consistently frustrated the efforts of Governor Ross to disperse the ring by appointing ring members to key patronage positions in his Democratic administration.⁴³ The campaign of 1886 thus promised to be a repetition of the contest of 1884 to determine which faction of the Santa Fe Ring would carry New Mexico's standard to Washington.

Perhaps owing to the strategy of the Republicans in concentrating their assaults on incumbent Joseph, rather than attacking the entire Democratic party, the campaign of 1886 quickly degenerated into a mudslinging contest.⁴⁴ Dwyer received a scorching at the hands

of the territorial Democratic press, which daily accused him of anti-Mexican prejudice, moral turpitude, and the murder of a number of Taos County shepherders.⁴⁵ Dorsey responded to these attacks with an open letter to Gildersleeve, published in the *Colfax County Stockman*, that raised personal abuse to the level of an art form and would have justified Gildersleeve in a suit for slander.⁴⁶

Vicious attacks on the Democrats, however, did not help to overcome a serious problem within the Republican party. Although former candidate Prince campaigned for the Republican ticket, many Republicans resented Dorsey's part in the split of 1884, which had cost Prince that election. To repay Dorsey and Dwyer, many of these Republicans either stayed home or voted for Joseph in 1886, helping to turn a Republican majority of 2,851 into a Democratic majority of 3,888 and resulting in Dwyer's defeat.⁴⁷ The Democratic attacks on Dwyer also took their toll, as he carried only two of the territory's eleven counties and lost overwhelmingly in the Mexican areas of the territory.⁴⁸ Many Republicans, including Catron, believed that Dwyer had lost because of Dorsey's presence in the campaign, and one newspaper predicted that "now Dorsey has ungracefully retired to the oblivion of his ranch and cattle, and will probably never again bob up in the politics of New Mexico."⁴⁹

But Dorsey was not ready to retire. He still dreamed of returning to the United States Senate. Immediately after the election, he held an elaborate reception at his remodelled home on the Mountain Spring ranch, and as 1887 arrived, he formed a syndicate to purchase the Maxwell land grant from its Dutch owners.⁵⁰ The Dutch, however, would not sell, and by the summer of 1887, Dorsey found himself forced again to defend his title to the land he already held.⁵¹

The election of Benjamin Harrison to the presidency in 1888 was the occasion for much political maneuvering in New Mexico. It was assumed that all patronage positions Democrats now held would be restored to the Republicans, and Catron held a closed meeting of Republican leaders of the Santa Fe Ring to apportion territorial offices among the faithful.⁵² By this time, however, four years of internal dissension had considerably weakened the power of the ring, and a number of Republicans rebelled at the idea that no one could hold office in New Mexico unless Catron approved.⁵³

One of these rebels was Joseph Dwyer, recently defeated in a bid for the congressional delegate's seat. Dwyer travelled to Harrison's home in Indianapolis soon after the presidential election to stake his claim on the New Mexico governorship.⁵⁴ With Dorsey's vigorous assistance, Dwyer soon claimed the support of most of New Mexico's Republican press, as well as the endorsements of national political figures like William Windom and John Sherman.⁵⁵

The campaign soon took on the appearance of a Catron-Dorsey feud, although neither man was a candidate.⁵⁶ Catron claimed that Dorsey and Dwyer were responsible for the weakened condition of the Republican party in New Mexico, and he told Elkins that Dwyer's appointment "would be ruinous to me. . . . It would be the same as having *Dorsey* as Dwyer is a tool in his hand only."⁵⁷ But while Catron and Dorsey were fighting to keep the patronage in New Mexico from each other, a third candidate, opposed to both of them, entered the race: former Chief Justice L. Bradford Prince.

Prince was a relative latecomer to the campaign, but he soon gained strong support among the many Republicans who saw him as the logical opponent of the Santa Fe Ring.⁵⁸ With Prince in the race, Dorsey redoubled his campaign efforts, travelling to Washington to warn Interior Secretary John Noble of the disaster that would befall New Mexico if Prince were appointed governor.⁵⁹ It appeared to some observers that Dorsey was now more interested in securing Prince's defeat than he was in Dwyer's victory. When Harrison finally appointed Prince in April 1889, other contenders and their champions rallied behind the new governor; only Dorsey refused to accept the president's decision.⁶⁰

Dorsey had possibly hoped for a share in New Mexico's patronage under a Dwyer administration, but Dwyer's failure to receive the governorship marked the end of Dorsey's career in politics. The mirror had cracked; the blue smoke had cleared. Dorsey had lost all real political power in 1881 and had retained his influence only by convincing others that he would regain it. In 1889 he staked all that remained of his political reputation on Dwyer's election, and lost. By the rules of this most ephemeral of games, he was finished.

While Dorsey had gambled his entire political future on the outcome of this race, for Catron it was only a minor skirmish in a larger battle. Even though his candidate was also defeated, he could

rest satisfied that Dorsey had been driven from the New Mexico political arena. The smoke around the Santa Fe Ring had largely cleared by 1889, but by then the ring was no longer necessary. Catron had clearly established a reputation of power that was unassailable. When New Mexico finally did, as Dorsey had foreseen, "become one among the sisterhood of states," the place in the Senate that Dorsey had hoped to occupy was filled by Thomas B. Catron.

NOTES

1. *Chicago Herald*, 21 February 1884.
2. *Houston Daily Post*, 18 May 1884.
3. The quotation from Hobbes is in *Leviathan*, part 1, Chapter 10. Jimmy Breslin, *How the Good Guys Finally Won: Notes from an Impeachment Summer* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1976), pp. 30–32.
4. Note, for example, the correspondence in the L. Bradford Prince papers during a time when his position as chief justice of New Mexico was threatened. His position was vulnerable not because he was performing badly, but because the senators from his home state of New York were opposed to his keeping the position (Benjamin Hicks to Prince, 23 April 1881; George H. Foster to Prince, 28 April 1881; George William Curtis to Prince, 12 May 1881, L. Bradford Prince Papers, New Mexico State Records Center and Archives [SRCA], Santa Fe).
5. Robert J. Rosenbaum, "Mexicano versus Americano: A Study of Hispanic-American Resistance to Anglo-American Control in New Mexico Territory, 1870–1900" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1972), pp. 28–35.
6. Howard R. Lamar, *The Far Southwest, 1846–1912: A Territorial History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 149–51.
7. Walter J. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince: Chief Justice and Governor of New Mexico Territory, 1879–1893" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1967), pp. 48–49.
8. U.S., Congress, House, Report of the Secretary of the Interior for the Year Ending June 30, 1887, House Ex. Doc. 1, pt. 5, 50th Cong., 1st sess., 1887, p. 666.
9. Ross to John O'Grady, 26 March 1887, Ross Papers, SRCA.
10. Ross to O'Grady, 26 March 1887, Ross Papers.
11. Lewis Kingman to H. M. Arms, 8 July 1877, U.S., Bureau of Land Management, Surveyor General's Reports, Papers Relating to New Mexico Land Grants, Records of Private Land Claims Adjudicated by the U.S. Surveyor-General, 1855–1900, Report No. 94, "Uña de Gato," SRCA, Reel 22, frames 336–38; Arms to Wm. Evarts, 5 October 1877, Surveyor General's Reports, Report No. 94, frames 333–34. For a more extensive discussion of Dorsey's involvement with the Uña

de Gato land claim, see Sharon K. Lowry, "Portrait of an Age: The Political Career of Stephen W. Dorsey, 1868-1889" (Ph.D. diss., North Texas State University, 1980), pp. 121-55.

12. Lamar, *Far Southwest*, p. 151.

13. Thomas J. Caperton, *Rogue! Being an Account of the Life and High Times of Stephen W. Dorsey, United States Senator and New Mexico Cattle Baron* (Santa Fe: Museum of New Mexico Press, 1978), p. 23.

14. Robert W. Larson, *New Mexico Populism: A Study of Radical Protest in a Western Territory* (Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1974), pp. 25-26.

15. W. S. Fletcher to Dorsey, 8 September 1884; Dorsey to Fletcher, 22 September 1884, 29 October 1884, Records of the Grand Army of the Republic, SRCA.

16. Larson, *New Mexico Populism*, p. 31.

17. *Springer* (New Mexico) *Banner*, 6, 27 March 1890.

18. *Washington Post*, 2 July 1883; *Denver Republican*, 17 January 1884.

19. Lamar, *Far Southwest*, pp. 163-65; Victor Westphall, *Thomas Benton Catron and His Era* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1973), pp. 189-94.

20. Darlis A. Miller, "William Logan Rynerson in New Mexico, 1862-1893," *New Mexico Historical Review* (NMHR) 48 (April 1973): 119-21.

21. Draft manuscript dated February 1889, "Santa Fe Ring" folder, Prince Papers.

22. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 136-37.

23. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 138-39.

24. Larson, *New Mexico Populism*, p. 25.

25. M. W. Mills to Prince, 23 October 1884, Prince Papers.

26. Roscoe Conkling to Chester Arthur, 29 January 1879, Chester A. Arthur Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (LC).

27. W. Miller to Prince, 9 May 1881; W. G. Ritch to Prince, 25 March 1881; Benjamin Hicks to Prince, 23 April 1881, Prince Papers; Dorsey to Wayne MacVeagh, 12 May 1881, James A. Garfield Papers, LC.

28. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," p. 149.

29. *Proceedings in the Trial of the Case of the United States vs. John W. Dorsey, John R. Miner, John M. Peck, Stephen W. Dorsey, Harvey M. Vaile, Montfort C. Rerdell, Thomas J. Brady, and William H. Turner for Conspiracy*, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1882), 2: 851-83.

30. Dorsey to Prince, 16 October 1884, Prince Papers.

31. Dorsey to Prince, 16 October 1884, Prince Papers.

32. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 117, 145.

33. Dorsey to Prince, 16 October 1884, Prince Papers.

34. Draft manuscript dated February 1889, "Santa Fe Ring" folder, Prince Papers.

35. Howard R. Lamar, "Edmund G. Ross as Governor of New Mexico: A Reappraisal," *NMHR* 36 (July 1961): 186.

36. Morris F. Taylor, *O. P. McMains and the Maxwell Land Grant Conflict* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979), p. 119.
37. *Colfax County Stockman*, 24 July 1886.
38. *Colfax County Stockman*, 24 July 1886.
39. *Colfax County Stockman*, 24 July 1886; *Santa Fe New Mexican*, 7 September 1886.
40. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 181-82.
41. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, 7 September 1886.
42. *Santa Fe New Mexican*, 7 September 1886.
43. Robert W. Larson, *New Mexico's Quest for Statehood, 1846-1912* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), pp. 144-46.
44. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," p. 165.
45. (Albuquerque) *Bernalillo County Democrat* reprinted in *Colfax County Stockman*, 30 October 1886; *Albuquerque Citizen* reprinted in *Colfax County Stockman*, 16 October 1886.
46. *Colfax County Stockman*, 23 October 1886.
47. *Santa Fe Weekly Leader*, 6 November 1886. Republican candidates had combined for 15,122 votes to Joseph's 12,271 in 1884; in 1886, Joseph defeated Dwyer by 3,888 votes.
48. *Las Vegas (New Mexico) Daily Optic*, 7 March 1889.
49. *Santa Fe Weekly Leader*, 6 November 1886.
50. *Raton Comet*, 30 October 1886; Jim B. Pearson, *The Maxwell Land Grant* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), pp. 152-53.
51. Pearson, *Maxwell Land Grant*, pp. 152-53; Morris F. Taylor, "Stephen W. Dorsey, Speculator-Cattleman," *NMHR* 49 (January 1974): 34-37.
52. William W. Griffin to Prince, 24 November 1888, Prince Papers.
53. R. E. Twitchell to Prince, 28 November 1888; Griffin to Prince, 14 December 1888; Miguel Salazar to Prince, 7 January 1889; William Breedon to Prince, 9 January 1889, Prince Papers.
54. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," p. 174.
55. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 181-82; endorsements of candidacy of J. W. Dwyer, of Raton, for Governor of New Mexico, Appointment Papers, Territory of New Mexico, 1850-1907, Records of the Department of the Interior, Record Group 48, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D.C.; C. H. Gildersleeve to Prince, 10 March 1889, Prince Papers.
56. *Raton Independent*, 8 December 1888.
57. Catron to Elkins, 9 February 1889, Thomas B. Catron Papers, University of New Mexico Library, Albuquerque (emphasis in original).
58. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 172-75.
59. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," p. 188.
60. Donlon, "LeBaron Bradford Prince," pp. 107-8; J. J. Fitzgerald to Prince, 2 April 1889; M. W. Mills to Prince, 2 April 1889; W. L. Rynerson to Prince, 20 April 1889, Prince Papers.